IV. The Dataset IAB-Betriebspanel: 2008 -2013 surveys (with data covering the period 2007 -2012 .
Why 2008 as the starting period?
Use of 5 innovation dummies covering product (radical, imitation, incremental, and composite measure) and process innovation Wide range of controls in addition to collective bargaining status and workplace representation: establishment workforce structure, age, size, state of technology, ownership, share of exports in sales, expected sales development, competitive pressure, profit situation, presence of an R&D department, expansion investments as share of total investment; whether the establishment resulted for a spin-off or had experienced the integration of other establishments; and industry dummies.
… dataset continued
We did not use information on orientation or opting out/pacts, but did exploit a question contained in the 2009, 2011, and 2013 waves of inquiring of the reasons for failing to innovate. Restrictions: sample limited to plants with at least 5 employees in the private sector, excluding agriculture, extractive industries, and public utilities.
. Some Introductory Facts ince we are looking at plants that are observed on either single or multiple occasions, we eed to determine that they are not too distinctive from their innovation profiles. e find that pure cross section units tend to reveal a higher incidence of innovation than anel units across all types of innovation. ther findings are that the incidence of product innovation is higher and more ongoing than rocess innovation; that incremental innovation is the most common and persistent type of nnovation, and radical product innovation the least; and that a sizable subset of German stablishments do not innovate. able 1 gives the unconditional probability of innovation in the pooled data as well as the robabilities conditional on works council and collective bargaining status. able 2 gives the tetrachoric correlation coefficients for these institutional and innovation easures. Table 1 shows that works councils and collective bargaining are associated with a higher incidence of innovation of all types, if not to the same degree. The data also suggest that firm agreements are also somewhat more favorable to innovation than sectoral agreements. This pattern largely obtains when we disaggregate by broad sector (manufacturing and services) and also by establishment size. Table 2 shows that there is a strong positive correlation between works councils and innovation although the association between innovation and collective bargaining is weaker. Again, firm agreements seemingly have the edge, especially in the case of incremental innovations. , 2007-2012 Notes: The reported coefficients provide the correlations between pairs of binary variables and are obtained using a biprobit model with no regressors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
… introductory facts (continued)

Type of innovation
VI. Cet. Par. Analysis
A. Regression results using pooled data
We first provide results in Table 3 for a linear probability model for our dichotomous innovation variables. Of the key institutional variables we now drop firm-level agreements for consistency with our subsequent analysis and because such agreements represent just 7.5% of the total sample.
We thus have a total of 4 possible combinations: no sectoral agreement-no works council (reference category), no sectoral agreement-works council, sectoral agreement-no works council, and sectoral agreement-works council.
We have an extensive set of establishment-level variables, as well as time, size, and industry dummies, although Table 3 just gives the results for the institutional arguments.
What do we find? Well, the coefficient estimates for the institutional dummies are not statistically significant in one-half of the cases. Note the poor showing in respect of imitation and radical innovations.
But there is the suggestion that sectoral agreements without (with) a works council are seemingly unlikely (likely) to be associated with a higher probability of innovation.
Some additional remarks.
. , 2007-2012 Notes: Clustered (by establishment) standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Incremental
Interdependence and Exogeneity Considerations
Two obvious concerns are the potential interdependence of sectoral agreements and works council presence and the assumed exogeneity of the two variables in the innovation equation. Our approaches to this issue are both informal and formal.
In the former context, we looked to three pieces of 'descriptive' evidence on interdependence: (i)We examined the (eight) reasons for not implementing planned innovation changes contained in the 2009, 2011 and 2013 surveys to determine whether there were systematic differences between plants with and without sectoral agreements and plants with and without works councils. The null hypothesis that the incidence of the problems serving to frustrate innovation are the same in establishments with and without sectoral agreements (works councils) were rejected in just 2 (5) out of 24 cases, suggesting that establishment characteristics omitted in Table 3 are not correlated in some obvious way with a particular institutional configuration.
(ii)We also examined the relative frequency of transitions into and out of collective agreements/works councils. The former transitions, at approximately 6%, were three times greater than of the latter.
(iii)Finally, are these institutional transitions linked? To examine this question we considered the works council transitions of sectoral agreement joiners and leavers. Very roughly speaking, over a period of six years, 10 out of 100 sectoral agreement joiners changed their works council status, and similarly for sectoral agreement leavers.
… interdependence and exogeneity considerations (continued)
Our formal interdependence and exogeneity tests are, respectively, a recursive, simultaneous equations model and a single-equation linear probability model with two selection arguments obtained from a bivariate probit with two choice equations in the manner of Hübler and Jirjahn (2003).
The recursive model
As can be seen from Table 4 , it appears that works councils are more likely when sectoral agreements are present (second equation), that works council presence per se is favorable to innovation, if not that of a collective agreement again taken in isolation (third equation, Alternative 1), while only the combination of the two institutions points to greater innovative activity (third equation, Alternative 2). Moreover, the null that the correlation across unobservables in the three equations of the system is statistically different from zero cannot be rejected, ruling out the possibility that the role of institutions is the result of unobserved establishment characteristics. Table 5 indicates that the selectivity term for sectoral agreement presence is significantly different from zero in 3 out of 6 cases, though only in 1 case and then marginally for works council presence. But key finding is that the impact on the sign and significance of the three interaction terms is muted (cf. Table 3 ). otes: Clustered (by establishment) standard errors in parentheses. The two selectivity terms for the presence of works council and sectoral reement being derived from a biprobit that uses a non-common set of regressors in the corresponding choice equations. The null of no terdependence between the two equations in the biprobit is rejected comfortably at the 0.01 level. *, **, and *** denote statistical gnificance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The linear probability model with selection
B. Difference-in-Differences
We next more fully exploit the panel structure of the data.
We require a pre-treatments and a treatment period, respectively t 0 and t 1 . For example, t 0 = 2007-2008 and t 1 = 2009-2012. In this case we require six years of consecutive observation
We require appropriate comparison groups: sectoral agreement leavers vs. collective agreement stayers and joiners versus never members.
In a less demanding exercise, we shall require establishments to be observed only over four rather than six consecutive years; specifically, t 0 = 2 years and t 1 =2 years, and hence deploy thre moving windows. So we are comparing, say, plants that are not covered by a collective agreement in and comparing the incidence of innovative activity among those that joined an agreement in t 1 with that of those who stayed uncovered. Finally, we have to further redefine the samples by their innovation or non-innovation status in t 0 and t 1 .
We thus have four different scenarios shown in Table 6 (for t 0 = 2007-2008 and t 1 = 2009-2010, ignoring works council status for expositional convenience). Table 7 gives the results for joining and leaving a collective agreement in t 1 . It can be seen that in the subsample of establishments without works councils in t 0 joining a collective agreement is associated with reduced innovative activity among the sample of innovating establishments, while leaving collective bargaining may also be favorable to innovation among non-innovators in circumstances where a works council was present in the earlier period. The wider message, however, is that collective bargaining seemingly does not impair innovation to any material degree in specifications that also control for the endogeity of sectoral agreements (and works councils).
Findings
This broader message is reiterated in Table 8 which purges (the small number of) works council switchers from the sample. The finding among non-innovators of a positive effect of leaving a collective agreement mirrors the finding in Table 7 . For its part, among earlier innovators leaving a collective agreement versus staying covered seemingly has no direct effect although works council presence in such circumstances is associated with a marginally significant decline in innovation.
In the final application considered here, we attempted to examine any possible longer-term impact by requiring six consecutive years of observation with t 0 = 2007-2008 and t 1 = 2009-2013. As can be seen from Table 9 , among early innovators abandoning collective bargaining reduces innovative activity, albeit significantly so only where a works council is present. Notes: No estimates could be obtained for the joining scb vs. staying uncovered/non-innovator case in the second column. The selectivity terms are derived from a biprobit that models, respectively, works council presence and sectoral agreement transitions. The null of no interdependence across the two equations in the biprobit is always rejected at the 0.01 level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
VII. Conclusions
The largely Anglo-Saxon focus of the (investment and) innovation literature, taken in conjunction with recent theoretical developments, suggest that there is an pressing need to examine other-country experience, not least the German case. The pooled data estimates provided here is broadly favorable to joint presence of both institutions. This is no less true of process than product innovation, even if there is no suggestion of any positive effect on radical (product) innovation. Our DiD estimates yielded mixed results. Thus, there was the finding among noninnovators that leaving a collective agreement could actually benefit innovative activity. By the same token, it was also reported for innovators that leaving (joining) a collective agreement can be injurious to innovation in the presence (absence) of a works council. If there was little overall indication that the role of collective bargaining was to inhibit innovation, there was some suggestion then that the role of the dual system was mutually supportive. Nevertheless, it has to be borne in mind we have largely focused on one composite facet of innovative activity. Research using other datasets and other indicators (such as continuous input and output measures) is patently required.
